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COUCH V. UNITED STATES: THE SUPREME COURT TAKES
A FRESH LOOK AT THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGEOR DOES IT?

Introduction
Should communication between accountants or attorneys acting
as accountants and their clients be deemed privileged? There has
been a great amount of disagreement as to how this question should
be answered.' In seeking an answer it will be useful to examine the
present standing of the accountant-client privilege, and to attempt to
predict the future development of the privilege in the light of Couch
v. United States.2 In that case, Lillian Couch, the owner of a small

business and subject of an audit by the Internal Revenue Service,
was in the practice of keeping her records and books in the office of
her accountant. An agent of the Internal Revenue Service went to
the accountant's office and inspected those books and records, which
indicated to the agent that there had been an understatement of
gross income. He called in a special agent who conducted further
investigation and attempted to talk to Mrs. Couch's accountant, but

the accountant refused to see him. The special agent then had a
summons issued to secure Mrs. Couch's records from her accountant. 3
In an attempt to avoid delivery of the records to the Internal Revenue
Service, the accountant subsequently delivered the records to Mrs.
1 See generally 8 J. WGMORE, EVIDENCE IN Tmi.Ls AT COMMON LAW § 2286
(McNaughton ed. 1961) [hereinafter cited as WIGMoRE]; J. CAnEY & W. DOHERTY,
ETmcAL STANDARnDS OF T= AccoUrnG PROFESSION 134 (1966).
2 409 U.S. 322 (1973).
3 The summons was issued pursuant to INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 7602, which
reads as follows:
For the purpose of ascertaining the correctness of any return, making
a return where none has been made, determining the liability of any person for any internal revenue tax or the liability at law or in equity of any
transferee or fiduciary of any person in respect of any internal revenue tax,
or collecting any such liability, the Secretary or his delegate is authorized(1) To examine any books, papers, records, or other data which
may be relevant or material to such inquiry;
h (2) To summon the person liable for tax or required to perform
the act, or any officer or employee of such person, or any person having
possession, custody, or care of books of account containing entries relating to the business of the person liable for tax or required to perform the act, or any other person the Secretary or his delegate may deem
proper, to appear before the Secretary or his delegate at a time and
place named in the summons and to produce such books, papers, records,
or other data, and to give such testimony, under oath, as may be relevant or material to such inquiry; and
(3) To take such testimony of the person concerned, under oath,
as may be relevant or material to such inquiry.
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Couch's attorney. Even though the records were in the hands of the
attorney, the district court granted the special agent's petition to
enforce the summons. 4 The court of appeals affirmed, as did the
Supreme Court.6
To place Couch in proper perspective it is necessary to note several
relevant facts. The state of Virginia, where Mrs. Couch lived, does
7
not have a statute which provides for an accountant-client privilege.
The accountant was not an employee of Mrs. Couch, but an independent contractor who maintained a separate office and performed
services for other people as well." Moreover, the accountant was in
possession of the records when the summons was served.9 Thus it is
clear that Couch only addresses itself to the accountant-client privilege
in a limited context. Couch holds that the fifth amendment right not
to incriminate oneself through the production of personal records extends only to a person who is himself in possession of such records.10
Couch reaffirms that there is a "private enclave" wherein one has a
right to privacy, but that right was deemed to have been waived under
the circumstances in Couch.11
To understand the accountant-client privilege, one must look more
deeply into the privilege and its background than did the Court in
Couch. The Court dealt with the accountant-client privilege only in
the context of the Constitutional right to privacy and the right not to
incriminate oneself.' 2 It is also important to consider relevant statutes
and what, if anything, an attorney or an accountant may do to preserve
the privilege.'3
An understanding of the accountant-client privilege is important to
attorneys in two ways. An attorney may be called upon to defend a
client who desires to invoke the privilege or he may, himself, choose
4The opinion of the United States District Court for the Western District of
Virginia is not reported.
65Couch v. United States, 449 F.2d 141 (4th Cir. 1971).
Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322 (1973).

7 Id. at 327. The relevance of a state statute creating an accountant-client

privilege is discussed in the text accompanying notes 39-65 infra.
8Id. at 324.
9 Id. at 329.

10 Id. The majority opinion quotes from Johnson v. United States, 228 U.S.
457, 458 (1913), that "a party is privileged from producing the evidence, but
not from its production." The Court in Couch goes on to justify limiting Boyd v.

United States, 116 U.S. 615 (1886), which allowed a person in possession of
documents to treat them as privileged. That is, the majority in Couch limits the

broad language in Boyd to require possession. Thus Couch makes possession of a

document the most important factor.
11409 U.S. at 335-36. See also Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n of New York
Harbor, 378 U.S. 52 (1964).
12See text accompanying notes 22-38 infra.

1 See text accompanying notes 39-65 infra.

1973]

CoM2.wwrs

not to produce records of an accounting nature that he has kept for a
client. Depending on the situation, an attorney might argue in the
first case that there should be an accountant-client privilege analogous
to the attorney-client privilege, or in the latter situation that the client
should be able to invoke the attorney-client privilege even though the
attorney was acting in this instance as an accountant. It is therefore
helpful first to consider why courts will allow information a client has
conveyed to his attorney to remain confidential.
The attorney-client privilege had its origin in Roman law, 14 and
15
was given common law recognition in the early eighteenth century.
Originally the reason for the attorney-client privilege was a policy of
honor among attorneys, 6 but a more important reason developedthat of assuring the fullest possible benefit from the relationship
between attorney and client."7 While the attorney-client privilege was
evolving, the role of the accountant was limited because of a simplistic
approach to taxes and accounting. 18 Even though the role of the accountant eventually became more significant because of increased
record-keeping requirements and because the advisory duties of accountants became similar to those of attorneys, a rule of privilege
regarding accountant-client communication did not develop in the common law. 19 This lack of development is attributable in part to an interest
in limiting the creation of new privileges.20 In addition, there has been
doubt among authorities as to whether an accountant-client privilege
21
would actually be in the public interest.
Possible Sources of an Accountant-Client Privilege
Since there is no common law accountant-client privilege, 22 any

such privilege before the Internal Revenue Service must come from
another source. Where there is no accountant-client privilege created
by state statute, if relevant 23 information is to be treated as privileged
14 C. McCorwICK, EvmENCE §§ 126-27 (2d ed. 1972) [hereinafter cited as

McCoiUscx].
15 8 WIGMORE § 2290.

16 Id.
'7 Id.
18 See generally Note, Privileged Communications-Accountants and Accounting-A CriticalAnalysis of Accountant-Client Privilege Statutes, 66 MicH. L. Rmv.

1264, n.1 (1968).

19 E.g., Lustman v. Comm:ssioner, 322 F.2d 253 (3d Cir. 1963); Dorfman v.
Rombs, 218 F. Supp. 905 (N.D. IM. 1963). See also 8 WiGmORE § 2286.
20 8 WIGNoRE § 2286.
21 It is the general policy

of rules of evidence to give as much relevant information to the courts as possible. 8 WIGMoRE § 2192.
22 See 8 WIcIoaRE § 2286.
23 If information is not relevant the courts have no need for it and it is therefore inadmissible. McCoRmicK § 77. In the federal courts, irrelevant information
is precluded from discovery by FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b) (1).
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such immunity must result from a right to privacy,24 the attorney-client

privilege, or a protection against self-incrimination.
In regard to the last of these, the question is one of whether a

person may invoke the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination to keep relevant records and books from being viewed in an
Internal Revenue Service hearing. The Court in Couch v. United States
explains that papers and records are protected by the fifth amendment
only if they are in the possession of the person invoking the privilege.25

In Couch the Court states:
We do indeed believe that actual possession of documents bears
the most significant relationship to Fifth Amendment protections
26
against state compulsions upon the individual accused of a crime.

Moreover, the Court holds that a determination as to who has possession of the records must be made at the time the summons is
served. 27 This view of protecting the individual from being forced
to produce evidence rather than preventing the production of the
evidence itself 28 is consistent with interpretations29 given to Boyd v.
United States,30 in which it was held that private papers could be
kept out of a criminal proceeding through the self-incrimination

privilege.
By making the right against self-incrimination dependent upon
possession, the Court in Couch was faced with the problem of whether
there could be constructive possession.31

Unfortunately the Court

24 409 U.S. at 335-36. The Court discussed a constitutional right to privacy
provided by the fourth and fifth amendments taken as a whole; however they
determined that Mrs. Couch did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy.
25 409 U.S. at 327-36.
26 409 U.S. at 333.
27 409 U.S. at 329 n.9.
28 409 U.S. at 328-29. See note 10 supra.
29 To require a person to deliver a document could violate his right against
self-incrimination because the act of delivering the document would be a "statement" that it is the one requested in the subpoena, which would in fact be testimony. McCoaMicx §§ 126-27. See also 8 WIGMORE § 2286. However, Mr. Justice
Marshall in his dissent in Couch would view Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616
(1886), as making the desire of the author to keep the document secret, rather
than the necessity of his producing the document, the determinative factor.
30 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
81 See United States v. Guterma, 272 F.2d 344 (2d Cir. 1959), where turning
records over at the inducement of the Government did not waive the privilege;
accord, Schwimmer v. United States, 232 F.2d 855 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 352
U.S. 833 (1956) (records had been turned over for custodial safekeeping). In
Couch the members of the Court were not forced to decide how they would
handle a case if records were turned over at the government's inducement or only
for custodial safekeeping. However, Mr. Justice Brennan in his concurring opinion
states that he would make the information privileged under these and similar circumstances. 409 U.S. at 337-38.
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did not make any decision as to what constitutes possession:
Yet situations may well arise where constructive possession is so
clear or the relinquishment of possession is so temporary and inthe accused
significant as to leave the personal compulsions upon 32
substantially intact. But this is not the case before us.
Although the Court in Couch did not completely separate the right
to privacy from the protection against self-incrimination, the majority
did find that the right to privacy had been waived:
[t]here can be little expectation of privacy where records are
handed to an accountant, knowing that mandatory disclosure of
much of the information therein is required in an income tax return.
What information is not33disclosed is largely in the accountant's discretion, not petitioner's.
...

Mr. Justice Douglas3 4 and Mr. Justice Marshall3 5 in their dissenting
opinions each found that records in the hands of the accountant should
have been treated as privileged, because when records are held by
one's accountant they have not been taken from an area in which one
has a right to privacy.
Although there may still be legitimate arguments that the right to
privacy should not have been deemed waived and that requiring
production of records violated the fifth amendment, 36 the fact that
seven members of the Court have agreed should help clarify some
confusion that has existed regarding the accountant-client privilege. It
has been generally agreed that communication between the accountant
and client is not privileged in federal administrative hearings;37 this
case now establishes a guideline, not limited to administrative hearings,
for determining whether a privilege exists as to accounting records.
The issue will now be determined by whether the person desiring38 to
invoke the privilege is in possession of the information in question.
U.S. at 333-34.
a3409 U.S. at 335.
34409 U.S. at 338.
35 409 U.S. at 344.
36 See Tigue, Accountant-Client Communications, 12
32409

TAx CouNsxLoa's Q. 1
(1968) where the law is interpreted as requiring a person with a lawful possessory
interest to assert the fifth amendment privilege, although Tigue states it could be
asserted for another. He develops his view by an analysis of cases in which the
fifth amendment privilege has been asserted. Id. at 7-10. Couch, however, apparently does not require a lawful possessory interest and will clearly not allow
one person to claim the privilege for another. Couch requires possession by the
person who desires to claim privilege under the fifth amendment. 409 U.S. at
327-29.
37
See, e.g., Annot., 38 A.L.R.2d 670 (1954).
38409 U.S. at 330-36.
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Many States Have Statutes That Create
an Accountant-Client Privilege
Couch v. United States has virtually eliminated the possibility of
any claim for an accountant-client privilege based on the Constitution. 3 9 Moreover, since there was no accountant-client privilege at
common law,40 any further claim of this privilege must find its origin
in state statutes. Presently 15 states and Puerto Rico have statutes
41
which create an accountant-client privilege.
These statutes can be divided into three groups. The first category
is made up of statutes creating the accountant-client privilege with
only one limitation-the information must have been obtained by the
accountant in his confidential capacity.42 The wording in these statutes
is very general, causing some confusion in interpretation. The intermediate group of statutes 43 explicitly imposes one or more of the
following limitations: (1) the privilege is not applicable in criminal
or bankruptcy proceedings; (2) it is limited to communications made
to the accountant in the course of his employment; (3) the client may
waive the privilege. The third category of statutes 44 adds a clause
to the limitations in the statutes mentioned above, preventing assertion
of the privilege against other parties who detrimentally relied on the
accountant's audit.
Some of the statutes creating an accountant-client privilege are
more restrictive than others; none, however, embodies all the restrictions that are present in the attorney-client privilege. These are: (1)
that the information must have been conveyed with an expectation of
privacy, (2) that cases of fraud are excepted, and (3) that the in39 Id.
40 See note 19 supra.
41These jurisdictions

and statutes are as follows: Auz. REv. STAT. ANN.
§ 32-749 (Supp. 1972); COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 154-1-7(7) (1963); FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 473.141 (Supp. 1973); GA. CODE ANN. § 84-216 (1970); ILL. REV. STAT.
ch. 110 , § 51 (1969); IowA CODE § 116.15 (1971); Ky. REv. STAT. § 325.440
(Supp. 1972); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 37:85 (1964); MD. ANN. CODE art. 75A, §
20 (Supp. 1972); MicH. Comp. LAwS § 338.523 (Supp. 1972); Mo. REv. STAT.
§ 326.151 (1965); NEv. REv. STAT. §§ 49.125-.205 (1971); N.M. STAT. ANN. §
67-23-26 (1953); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 911a (1968); P.R. LAWs ANN. tit 20,
§ 79042 (1961); TENN. CODE ANN. § 62-114 (1955).
See GA. CODE ANN. § 84-216 (1970); Ky. REv. STAT. § 325.440 (Supp.
1972); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 67-23-26 (1953); P.R. LAws ANN. tit. 20, § 790 (1961).
Georgia's
statute is the only one that has virtually no limitations.
43
See Amz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 32-749 (Supp. 1972); COLO. REv. STAT. ANN.
§ 154-1-7(7) (1963); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 473.141 (Supp. 1973); IowA CODE §
116.15 (1971); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 37:85 (1964); MD. ANN. CODE art. 75A. §
20 (Supp. 1972); Mo. REV. STAT. § 326.151 (1959); NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 49.125.205 44
(1971); TENN. CODE ANN. § 62-114 (1955).
See MIcH. CouP. LAws § 338.523 (Supp. 1972); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63,
§ 911a (1968).
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formation must be relevant. 45 If statutes creating an accountant-client
privilege are to be justified, these requirements need to be added. One
writer states:
It is apparent that the existing accountant-client privilege statutes
have been loosely formulated without attempting accurately to
define the limited areas in which the privilege is actually justified. 46
Since these statutes have had limited application they have not
received the criticism they deserve. This limited application has resulted primarily because state statutes creating accountant-client privileges have been held to be inapplicable in administrative hearings
including Internal Revenue Service hearings. 47 Further, state statutes
are not generally applied in federal criminal cases, including fraud
cases initiated by the Internal Revenue Service. 48 For these reasons
it is obvious that the effect of such statutes is very limited. Since an
individual is not likely to be encouraged to give confidential information to his accountant by only a possibility of privilege, the primary
advantages of an accountant-client privilege are reduced or eliminated
49
by virtue of this limited application.
The choice of laws problem is confusing in theory5" but generally
not in application. 51 It is clear that an Internal Revenue Service hearing would come under the Erie doctrine 52 and the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure53 and that state law governing privilege should be
45 See Modem Woodmen of America v. Watkdns, 132 F.2d 352 (5th Cir. 1942).
See generally Note, Privileged Communications-Accountants and Accounting-A
Critical Analysis of Accountant-Client Privilege Statutes, supra note 18, at 1275
n.46.4 6
Note, Privileged Communications-Accountants and Accounting-A Critical
Analysis
47 of Accountant-Client Privilege Statutes, supra note 18, at 1277.
For a complete discussion of the confusion that exists in applying state
statutes before federal administrative agencies see Comment, Privileged Communications Before Federal Administrative Agencies: The Law Applied in the District Courts, 31 U. Cm. L. Rev. 395 (1964).
48 See In re Bordon Co., 75 F. Supp. 857 (E.D. Ill. 1948), where the court
held that the common law applied in feideral criminal cases according to FED. R.
Carm. P. 26, and that there was no accountant-client privilege at common law.
See also United States v. Kovel, 296 F.2d 918 (2d Cir. 1961).
49 The purpose of the accountant-client privilege, like that of the attorneyclient privilege, is to provide for full disclosure so that the attorney or accountant
may give accurate advice and the best representation possible. 8 W/SMOIE § 2291.
See aso Annot., 9 A.L.R.2d 797 (1950).
5 See, e.g., Petersen, Attorney-Client Privilege in Internal Revenue Service
Investigations, 54 MI-N. L. Rev. 67 (1969); Note, Privileged CommunicationsAccountants anAccccounting-A Critical Analysis of Accountant-Client Privilege
Statutes, supra note 18, at 1276.

F.2d 734 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 34 U.S. 864 (1953), which refused to apply a
state-created privilege.
2Erie R.R. v. Tompldns, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
53
Fm. R. Cirv. P. 43(a).
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applied, but the courts have not treated such administrative hearings
as civil cases. 54 The leading case in determining what law should be
applied is Falsone v. United States.5 5 In that case an accountant
contended that a federal tax investigation was a civil proceeding and
should be governed by the Erie doctrine and the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, thereby requiring application of a Florida statute which
provided for an accountant-client privilege. The court held, however,
that an administrative proceeding (i.e., a tax investigation) differs
from a civil proceeding so that the Federal Rules do not require
application of the state-created privilege. 56
In a later case, Baird v. Koener,5 the Ninth Circuit explained that
a state-created privilege would apply in a contempt enforcement
proceeding which the court distinguished from an agency investigation
as in Falsone. Nevertheless, this distinction has not prevailed.58 Confusion exists because later cases have not differentiated between types
of proceeding, but have resorted to citing Fatsone as holding that a
state-created accountant-client privilege simply does not apply.5 9 The
fact that later cases cite Falsone and Baird v. Koener as being either
supporting or failing to support the application of a state-created
privilege is particularly unfortunate because it has precluded the courts
from making a meaningful analysis of the question of when a statecreated accountant-client privilege should apply.60 In nearly all of the
civil cases the courts have refused to apply a state-created accountantclient privilege. 61 It is even more certain that a state-created accoun54 See generally Comment, Privileged Communications Before Federal Administrative Agencies: The Law Applied in the District Courts, supra note 47.
If a tax investigation was considered to be a civil proceeding, Erie and FED. R. Civ.
P. 43(a), which apply in civil proceedings but not in administrative hearings
would require the application of state substantive law (i.e., a statutorily created
accountant-client privilege). However, the courts have not treated federal tax
investigations as civil proceedings, so federal law, in which there is no accountantclient privilege, applies.
55 205 F.2d 734 (5th Cir. 1953).
Id.
l6 at 737. See note 53 supra.
57279 F.2d 623, 627-29 (9th Cir. 1960).
5s E.g., Petersen, supra note 50, at 70-80; Comment, Privileged Communications Before Federal Administrative Agencies: The Law Applied in the District
Courts, supra note 47; Comment, Accountants, Privileged Communications, and
Section 7602 of the InternalRevenue Code, 10 ST. Louis U.L.J. 252 (1965).
59
E.g., Colton v. United States, 306 F.2d 633 (2d Cir. 1962).
60
See FTC v. St. Regis Paper Co., 304 F.2d 731 (7th Cir. 1962), which distinguishes Baird v. Koener and Falsone. The court in St. Regis Paper Co. also discusses the rationale for allowing state-created privileges to apply in federal administrative hearings, and is thereby the exception rather than the rule.
61 See, e.g., Sale v. United States, 228 F.2d 682 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 350
U.S. 1006 (1956); Falsone v. United States, 205 F.2d 734 (5th Cir. 1953); Doffman v. Rombs, 218 F. Supp. 905 (N.D. Ill. 1963); Application of House, 144 F.
Supp. 95 (N.D. Cal. 1956). But see Palmer v. Fisher, 228 F.2d 603 (7th Cir.
(Continued on next page)
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tant-client privilege will not apply in federal criminal cases. 62
The Efficacy of an Accountant-Client Privilege
As mentioned above, there is doubt among authorities as to whether
an accountant-client privilege is in the public interest. Further, the
accountant-client privilege was excluded from the proposed federal
rules of evidence.6 3 One reason for discrediting the accountant-client
privilege is the belief that it is of little use to the honest citizen and
will only benefit those who desire to cheat the government.6 4 Another
criticism of the privilege is that its application would encourage forum
shopping.0 5 If a plaintiff wanted to sue a person living in another state
which had an accountant-client privilege and if he needed information
held by that individual's accountant, he would sue in a state not
having the privilege if possible. On the federal level this problem
would exist primarily in a diversity action where state law would be
applied.60 That is, the problem would be increased if the state-created
privilege were applied in the federal courts, because those wishing to
take advantage of the privilege could move to a state having such a
privilege, or possibly hire an accountant in such a state. Because a
been applied in federal courts this
state-created privilege has not
67
criticism has been weakened.
The strongest policy reason for not allowing the privilege is that
the public has the right to all relevant information 68 unless there is a
substantial reason for withholding it. Courts do not approve of statutes
which interfere with judicial access to relevant information.6 9 This is
particularly true in regard to statutory privileges that were not recognized at common law.70
In considering the efficacy of an accountant-client privilege it is
(Footnote continued from preceding page)

1955), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 965 (1956) where a federal court allowed a statecreated accountant-client privilege to stand.
62 See note 48 supra.
63 Co~NNa-lT, ON RULES OF PRACrIcE AND PROCEDURE OF THE JuDIcIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES DisTncr CoTrTs AN MAGISTRATES § 5.01, 46

F.R.D. 243 (1969).
64 See generally Leviton, Is Paragraph 51, Section 27, Chapter 110 , of
Illinois Revised Statutes, 1955 Entitled, "An Act to Regulate the Practice of
Public Accounting and to Repel Certain Acts Therein Named" Constitutional?,37
B. REcORD 291 (1956).
Cm. 65
See, e.g., Petersen, supra note 50, at 79-80.
66
Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
67 See generally Comment, Evidence-PrivilegedCommunications-Accountant
and Client, 46 N.C.L. REv. 419, 424-25 (1968).
68 See note 23 supra.
69 8 WIGMORE § 2291.

70
See United States v. Bowman, 358 F.2d 421 (3d Cir. 1966); see generally
Comment, A Symposium on the Uniform Rules of Evidence and Illinois Evidence
Law, 49 Nw. U.L. BEv. 481, 542-47 (1954).
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necessary to weigh all the relevant factors. 7 1 Wigmore provides four
fundamental conditions of social policy which should exist before a
privilege is established:
(1) The communications must originate in a confidence that they

will not be disclosed.

(2) This element of confidentiality must be essential to the full
and satisfactory maintenance of the relation between the parties.
(3) The relation must be one which in the opinion of the community is to be sedulously fostered.
(4) The injury that would inure to the relation by the disclosure
of the communications must be greater than
72 the benefit thereby

gained for the correct disposal of litigation.
Although all state statutes providing an accountant-client privilege do
not require that communication be made to accountants in confidence
in order to be privileged, 73 such a criterion could be established either
by corrective legislation or judicial interpretation.
The second of Wigmore's requirements can also be met in the
accountant-client relationship, at least where the accountant's work
is similar to that of an attorney.74 Sometimes the work is very similar,
as, for example, when an accountant determines what information
should be reported in the best interest of his client. However, there
has been difficulty in determining when an accountant is performing
services similar to those performed by an attorney.75 If the privilege
is to be applied only when this uncertain overalp exists, the benefits
of the privilege would hardly encourage the full disclosure between
the client and his accountant which is the purpose of having such a
privilege. 76 Beyond giving advice in a capacity similar to an attorney's,
if an accountant is to offer the full benefit of his skills the flow of information from the client to his accountant should be as complete as
possible. That is, the accountant-client privilege may be important to
a satisfactory client-professional relationship even where the accountant's duties are not similar to those of an attorney. The best approach
to the privilege would seem to be to require that there be an intent
that conversation remain confidential, and, if that intent exists, to
assume that confidentiality was necessary to a satisfactory relationship.
71

See Comment, Evidence-Privileged Communications-Accountant and
Client, supra note 67, which is devoted to an evaluation of the efficacy of the
accountant-client privilege.
72 8 WirmoRE § 2285 (emphasis added).
73 See notes 41-44 supra.
74
See generally Holtzman, How Far Does the Accountant-Taxpayer Privilege
Really Extend?, 45 TAxEs 654 (1967).
75 See Note, Privileged Communications-Accountants and Accounting-A
Critical
76 Analysis of Accountant-Client Privilege Statutes, supra note 18, at 1274.
See note 49 supra.
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This approach would create confidence in the application of the accountant-client privilege.
The third requisite is that the privilege must be important to the
community. As taxes have become more complicated and technical
and as financial records have become more important, the role and
importance of the accountant has naturally increased. Mr. Justice
Marshall in his dissenting opinion in Couch calls attention to the
necessity of transferring records to an accountant by stating, "[t]hat a
if the author is to
transfer is compelled by practical considerations
77
law."
the
under
available
benefits
claim
The criterion that is the source of most of the criticism of the
accountant-client privilege,78 however, is the last one, which suggests
weighing the benefits provided by the privilege against the benefits
which would accrue to society by full disclosure. This criticism is
based somewhat on the argument that the privilege would help only
those interested in committing income tax fraud.79 Nevertheless, as
discussed above, full disclosure, which is the purpose of any professional-client privilege, is important to a satisfactory accountant-client
relationship. To argue that the accountant-client privilege would only
help those interested in committing fraud would be no more sound than
an argument that the attorney-client privilege helps only criminals or
potential criminals. Another argument concerns the burden on the
Internal Revenue Service that would exist if it could not subpoena
records.8 0 This has been countered by the argument that in our
adversary system it is typically the role of the government to develop
82
facts on its own.8 ' As the need for full disclosure becomes greater
and the importance of the services of the accountant becomes apparent to a larger section of society, state legislatures may receive increased
pressure to pass laws creating an accountant-client privilege. Even
so, there would not be a great change in practice and dependence
on the privilege unless Congress created an accountant-client privilege
or the federal courts recognized the state-created privileges in administrative hearings.8 3 The better approach would be creation of a
federal accountant-client privilege. Another possible method of cre77 409 U.S. at 633.
78 See generally Comment, Evidence-PrivilegedCommunications-Accountant
and Client, supra note 67.
79
8 Id.

0Petersen, supra note 50, at 98-99.
81 Fahey, Testimonial Privilege of Accountants in FederalTax FraudInvestigations,8217 TAx. L. Bxv. 491, 509 (1962).
See generally Holtzman, supra note 74.
83 But see text accompanying note 60 supra. For a discussion of whether an
accountant-client privilege should exist see also Comment, Evidence-Privileged
Communications-Accountantand Client, supra note 67.
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ating a privilege is to view each claim for confidentiality of information
as being privileged only if it could meet certain criteria such as those
established by Wigmore.8 4 Relationships would not be privileged,
then, by specific inclusion in a statute, but by need for privilege on a
case by case basis.8 5 This method, however, would not encourage full
disclosure because there would be no assurance of privilege, so it is
probably better to continue to allow only those privileges specifically
established by common law or statutes.
When Can the Accountant-Client Privilege Squeeze
Under the "Attorney-Client Umbrelld'?
Since the Internal Revenue Service is not bound by an accountantclient privilege"6 and because there is not such a privilege at common
law,8 7 it is important to consider whether the accountant can squeeze
under the "attorney-client umbrella"8 and the situations in which an
attorney acting as an accountant may become involved. Here, too, the
advantage of having a privilege is partially undermined because the
factual circumstances under which communication will be deemed to
be privileged are uncertain. 9
Generally the information in the possession of an accountant will
be privileged if a client goes to an attorney first, so that the accountant
can be considered to be acting as an agent for the attorney. 90 In
Himmelfarb v. United States,91 the Ninth Circuit refused to consider
as privileged information in the possession of an accountant who was
hired by the attorney. The court held that the accountant was not
indispensable to the attorney-client relationship, so his presence waived
any privilege. 92 On the contrary, in United States v. Kovel,9 3 the
Second Circuit allowed information in the possession of an accountant
working for an attorney to be privileged. Later, in United States v.
84 8 WIGMORE
85

§ 2285.

See Note, Privileged Communications:A Case by Case Approach, 23 MEn.L.

REv. 86443 (1971).
See text accompanying notes 39-61 supra.
87
8 8 See note 19 supra.
This terminology is borrowed from Tigue, supra note 36, at 4. For cases
in this area see, e.g., Deck v. United States, 339 F.2d 739 (D.C. Cir. 1964) cert.
denied, 379 U.S. 1967 (1965); United States v. Judson, 322 F.2d 460 (9t1 Cir.
1963); United States v. Kovel, 296 F.2d 918 (2d Cir. 1961); Gariepy v. Unfted
States, 189 F.2d 459 (6th Cir. 1951); Himmelfarb v. United States, 175 F.2d 924
(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 838 U.S. 860 (1949).
89 See generally Lore & Goldfein, Accountant-Client Privilege: Where Does
it Exist
9 0 and How Far Does it Extend?, 30 J. TAXATION 308 (1969).
E.g., Tigue, supra note 36, at 4.
91 175 F.2d 924 (9th Cir. 1949).

Id.
98 296 F.2d 918 (2d Cir. 1961).
92

19731

COMMnTS

Judson,94 the Ninth Circuit joined the majority view and treated
information in the hands of an accountant, employed by an attorney,
as privileged. It should also be noted that if the court determines
that information in the hands of an accountant is privileged, then
that protection will also extend to workpapers and reports of
the accountant. 95 It has been said that, as a general rule, the
accountant comes under the attorney-client privilege if the client
goes to the attorney first,96 but it is important to note a restriction.
A privilege will not be deemed to exist beyond the purpose of
giving legal advice.97 The problem with the present system is
that the factual circumstances under which the accountant comes
within the attorney-client privilege are not consistently or clearly
defined. 8 It is not completely clear what the outcome would be if
the accountant sent the client to an attorney after several meetings
between the accountant and client. The courts also have not decided
how close the working relationship between the accountant and attorney must remain. In these borderline cases the client cannot have
faith in confidentiality, thereby making any privilege of little value. 99
Couch has not helped define limits in this area because in Couch the
client had gone to the accountant for several years before consulting
an attorney.
When an attorney acts as an accountant, information will not come
within the purview of the attorney-client privilege. 100 Once again a
problem exists in determining when the attorney is acting as an
accountant. In an early case, In re Fisher,101 the court compelled production of records, stating that the service (an audit) rendered by
the attorney was characteristically performed by an accountant, so
the attorney-client privilege was not allowed. A later case, Olender
v. United States,10 2 held that a tax return is also typically the work
of an accountant, but this view is disputed. 103 The better view is that
94322 F.2d 460 (9th Cir. 1963).
95
96 Id. at 466.
See, e.g., United States v. Judson, 322 F.2d 460 (9th Cir. 1963); Bauer v.
Orser, 258 F. Supp. 338 (D.N.D. 1966). See note 88 supra. In Reisman v.
Caplin, 375 U.S. 440 (1964), the Court indicated that the attorney-client privilege
would at least include an accountant hired by an attorney.
97 Olender v. United States, 210 F.2d 795 (9th Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 352
U.S. 98
982 (1957).
See Note, Privileged Communications-Accountants and Accounting-A
CriticalAnalysis of Accountant-Client Privilege Statutes, supra note 18, at 1274.
99 See note 49 supra.
300 See, e.g., Lore & Goldfein, supra note 95.
10151 F.2d 424 (S.D.N.Y. 1931).
102 210 F.2d 795, 806 (9th Cir. 1954).
103

See generally Petersen, supra note 50.
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tax returns are within the typical province of legal service as the court
held in Colton v. United States. 04 In these cases the courts have
evaluated the type of work that the attorney was performing. 10 This
type of evaluation leads to uncertainty which undermines the purpose
of having an attorney-client privilege. 10 6 The best approach would
seem to be for the courts to create a presumption depending on
whether the person holds himself out as an attorney or an accountant. 07
This would then be consistent with a person's expectations as to the
existence of a privilege and would encourage full disclosure in appropriate circumstances.
Conclusion
Does Couch v. United States help relieve the dilemma of the accountant or the attorney acting as an accountant in determining what
communications are privileged? Although the law is not clear it is
possible to note some guidelines, particularly in regard to what an
accountant can do to prevent denial of a claim of privilege, to assure
the client of a right against self-incrimination, and to assure him of his
right to privacy, where possible.
The primary importance of Couch is that the Court makes it clear
that it will give all possible consideration to possession when considering constitutional rights that could prevent disclosure. If Mrs.
Couch had been in possession of the records when the summons was
served, she would not have been required to produce them. 08 This
tells the accountant that he should not retain any documents that he
can avoid keeping. When the accountant is finished with records he
should return them to the client as completely and quickly as possible.
Next, an accountant and client should not rely on a state-created
privilege when dealing with federal tax matters, because it is unlikely
that the state law will apply. This may not be logical or even the best
approach, but the courts have refused to apply state-created accountant-client privileges in federal administrative proceedings. This
obviously makes the state-created privileges of little value since much
104 306 F.2d 633 (2d Cir. 1962). But see Canaday v. United States, 354 F.2d
849, 857 (8th Cir. 1966), where the court said an attorney who was filling out
tax returns was acting as a "mere scrivener." For a criticism of Canaday, see
Comment, The Attorney-Client Privilege in the Preparationof Tax Returns, 33 Mo.

L. Rv.
0 5 122 (1968).
1

See also United States v. Chin Lim Mow, 12 F.R.D. 433 (N.D. Cal. 1952).

106 See note 49 supra.
'OT For
308 409

a similar view, see Petersen, supra note 50.
U.S. at 327-29.
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of the accountant-client relationship is devoted to completing records
required by the government through its administrative agencies.
Finally, if it appears to an accountant that a client might have conflicts with the government, that client should be sent to an attorney
as soon as possible. This should create a probability that appropriate
information later conveyed to the accountant would come under the
attorney-client privilege. The attorney acting as an accountant should
remember that information conveyed to him by a client, under these
circumstances, will not be protected by the attorney-client privilege.
For accounting information to be privileged, other than by the attorneyclient privilege, it should be remembered that possession is the determinative factor.
R. David Lester

